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Abstract
We study an economy where a collection of indivisible goods are sold to a set of
buyers who want to buy at most one good. We characterize the set of Walrasian
equilibrium price vectors in such an economy using sets of overdemanded and underde-
manded goods. Further, we give characterizations for the minimum and the maximum
Walrasian equilibrium price vectors of this economy. Using our characterizations, we
give a sucient set of rules that generates a broad class of ascending and descending
auctions in which truthful bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium.
JEL Classication: C62, D44, D50
This research was done when the rst author was visiting Tilburg University. The authors would like
to thank participants of several meetings and seminars where this paper was presented for therir helpful
comments.
yCorresponding author. Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 7 S.J.S. Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi
110016, India, E-mail: dmishra@isid.ac.in
zA.J.J. Talman, Department of Econometrics & Operations Research and CentER, Tilburg University,
P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands, E-mail: talman@uvt.nl
11 Introduction
The classical Arrow-Debreu model (Arrow and Debreu, 1954) for studying competitive equi-
librium assumes goods to be divisible (commodities). But economies with indivisible goods
are common in many types of markets such as housing markets, job markets, and auctions
with goods like spectrum licenses. This paper investigates economies with indivisible goods
under the assumption that buyers have unit demand, i.e., every buyer can buy at most one
good. The unit demand assumption is common, for example, in settings of housing and job
markets.
In case of quasi-linear utilities of buyers, the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium is
guaranteed, and the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors form a complete lattice
(Shapley and Shubik, 1972). In this work, we characterize the Walrasian equilibrium price
vectors using the notions of overdemanded and underdemanded sets of goods. A set of goods
is (weakly) overdemanded at a price vector if the number of buyers who demand goods only
from that set is greater than (or equal to) the number of goods in that set. A set of goods
is (weakly) underdemanded at a price vector if their prices are positive and the number of
buyers who demand goods from that set is less than (or equal to) the number of goods in
that set. Our rst result is that a price vector is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector if
and only if there is no set of overdemanded and underdemanded goods at that price vector.
Since overdemanded goods indicate the presence of excess demand and underdemand goods
indicate the presence of excess supply, our characterization re
ects the intuition that a price
vector is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector if and only if there is no excess supply and no
excess demand.
The notion of overdemanded and underdemanded sets of goods has been studied in the
context of designing iterative auctions, where prices either increase monotonically (ascending
auctions) or decrease monotonically (descending auctions). Demange et al. (1986) use the
notion of overdemanded goods to design an ascending auction that terminates at the mini-
mum Walrasian equilibrium price vector. Analogously, Sotomayor (2002) uses the notion of
underdemanded goods, albeit a slightly dierent notion from ours, to design a descending
auction that terminates at the maximum Walrasian equilibrium price vector. Both papers,
however, do not make any connection between these notions.
Gul and Stacchetti (2000) consider a model where they allow a buyer to buy more than
one good and having gross substitutes valuations. In such a model, a Walrasian equilibrium
price vector is guaranteed to exist, and the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors form a
complete lattice (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999). For such a model, they provide a generalization
of Hall's theorem (Hall, 1935), which results in a necessary condition for a Walrasian equi-
librium (see Theorem 3 in Gul and Stacchetti (2000)). Therefore, they do not characterize
the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors, which is what we will do for our model. Also,
Hall's theorem is not enough to characterize the Walrasian equilibrium price vectors in our
model. We show that we can use Hall's theorem to guarantee only one of the two conditions
2required for a Walrasian equilibrium.
We will also characterize the minimum and the maximum Walrasian equilibrium price
vectors. A price vector is the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector if and only if no
set of goods is overdemanded and no set of goods is weakly underdemanded at this price
vector. Similarly, absence of sets of weakly overdemanded goods and underdemanded goods
completely characterizes the maximum Walrasian equilibrium price vector.
A motivation for this work is the growing literature on ascending combinatorial auc-
tions (Cramton et al., 2006). Ascending auctions are preferred over their sealed-bid counter-
parts for a variety of reasons. For the model considered in this work, an ascending auction
will typically maintain a price for every good, and monotonically increase them based on the
bids of buyers. The terminating condition in such ascending auctions is a Walrasian equi-
librium. Moreover, terminating at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector ensures
that truthful bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium for the bidders - this is a standard result
in this literature (see for example Bikhchandani et al. (2002)), and can be understood from
the fact that the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector corresponds to the payments
of the strategy-proof Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism in our model (Leonard, 1983). How-
ever, there are several algorithms, both Demange et al. (1986) and Sankaran (1994) describe
such methods, that can be interpreted as an ascending auction that terminates at the mini-
mum Walrasian equilibrium. An objective of this work is to give a broad class of ascending
and also descending auctions that terminate at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price
vector.
Using our main characterization results, we give a sucient set of rules that generates a
broad class of ascending and descending auctions. Our class of auctions include the ascending
auctions in Demange et al. (1986) and Sankaran (1994). Thus, our results unify the existing
ascending auctions in the literature. Further, we hope that our broad class of ascending and
descending auctions will be useful in identifying specic auctions in this class that are easier
to implement in practice than the existing auctions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formally describe the model.
Section 3 describes the concepts of overdemanded and underdemanded goods. Section 4 gives
the characterizations of the dierent regions of price vectors. In Section 5, we discuss some
implications of our characterization results, and we conclude in Section 6.
2 The Model
There is a set of indivisible goods N = f0;1;:::;ng for sale to a set of buyers M = f1;:::;mg.
Each buyer can be assigned to at most one good. The good 0 is a dummy good which can be
assigned to more than one buyer. The value of buyer i 2 M on good j 2 N is vij, assumed to
be a non-negative real number. Every buyer has zero value on the dummy good. A feasible
allocation  assigns every buyer i 2 M a good i 2 N such that no good in N n f0g is
assigned to more than one buyer. Note that a feasible allocation assigns every buyer a good
3(may be the dummy good), but some goods may not be assigned to any buyer. We say good
j 2 N is unassigned in  if there exists no buyer i 2 M with i = j. Let   be the set




i2M vii for all  2  .
A price vector p 2 R
n+1
+ assigns every good j 2 N a nonnegative price pj with p0 = 0.
We assume quasi-linear utilities. Given a price vector p, the payo of buyer i 2 M on
good j 2 N at price vector p is vij   pj. The demand set of buyer i at price vector p is
Di(p) = fj 2 N : vij   pj  vik   pk 8 k 2 Ng.
Denition 1 A Walrasian equilibrium (WE) is a price vector p and a feasible allocation
 such that
i 2 Di(p) for all i 2 M (WE-1)
and
pj = 0 for all j 2 N that are unassigned in : (WE-2)
If (p;) is a WE, then p is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector and  is a Wal-
rasian equilibrium allocation.
It is well known that every Walrasian equilibrium allocation is ecient (Shapley and Shubik,
1972). Moreover, the set of WE price vectors is non-empty 1, and forms a complete lattice
(Shapley and Shubik, 1972) 2. This implies the existence of a unique minimum WE price
vector (pmin) and a unique maximum WE price vector (pmax). Of all the WE price vectors,
pmin stands out since it corresponds to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payments of buyers
assigned to them in a WE (Leonard, 1983). The VCG payment is dened as the externality
of a buyer on the remaining buyers (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973), and the VCG
mechanism is an ecient and strategy-proof mechanism. In this work, we aim to characterize
all WE price vectors, in particular pmin and pmax, and discuss its implications.
For any two price vectors p and p0 of equal dimension, we write p = p0 if pj = p0
j for all
j. If there exists a j at which pj 6= p0
j, then we write p 6= p0. If pj  p0
j for all j then we
write p  p0 or p0  p. If p  p0 but p 6= p, then we write p 
 p0 or p0  p. If there exists
some j for which pj < p0
j, then we write p  p0 or p0  p.
1The existence of a WE price vector follows from a standard linear programming duality argument and is
proved in Shapley and Shubik (1972). The ecient allocation problem can be written as a standard one-to-
one assignment problem, which always has an optimal solution (Leonard, 1983; Bikhchandani and Ostroy,
2002). So, the dual of such a linear program will also always have an optimal solution. Such optimal dual
solutions correspond to the WE price vectors (Bikhchandani and Ostroy, 2002). Moreover, conditions WE-1
and WE-2 are complementary slackness conditions corresponding to these primal and dual linear programs.
2We can see that the set of WE price vectors is a special type of lattice. Given a WE (p;), the inequalities
that dene this price vector are pj   pi  [vij   vii] for all i 2 M and for all j 2 N. These are lines in
two dimensions, and they are either parallel to one of the axes (since p0 = 0 for all price vectors) or at 45
degrees to both the axes in that dimension.
43 Overdemand and Underdemand
We dene demanders of a set of goods S  (N n f0g) at price vector p as U(S;p) = fi 2
M : Di(p) \ S 6= ;g. We dene the exclusive demanders of a set of goods S  (N n f0g)
at price vector p as O(S;p) = fi 2 M : Di(p)  Sg. Clearly, for every p and every
S  (N n f0g), we have O(S;p)  U(S;p). We denote the cardinality of a nite set S as
#S. Given a price vector p, dene N+(p) = fj 2 N : pj > 0g. By denition 0 = 2 N+(p) for
any p.
Denition 2 A set of goods S is overdemanded at price vector p if S  (N n f0g)
and #O(S;p) > #S. A set of goods S is weakly overdemanded at price vector p if
S  (N n f0g) and #O(S;p)  #S.
The notion of overdemanded sets of goods can be found in Demange et al. (1986) and
Sankaran (1994), who use it as a basis for the design of ascending auctions for the model of
our paper. For settings where a buyer can buy more than one good, the notion of overde-
manded goods has been generalized in Gul and Stacchetti (2000), de Vries et al. (2007), and
Mishra and Parkes (2007), who also use it as a basis for the design of ascending auctions for
general models.
Denition 3 A set of goods S is underdemanded at price vector p if S  N+(p) and
#U(S;p) < #S. A set of goods S is weakly underdemanded at price vector p if S 
N+(p) and #U(S;p)  #S.
The notion of underdemanded sets of goods can be found in Sotomayor (2002) 3, who
uses it to design descending auctions for our model.
Both concepts give us an idea about the imbalance of supply and demand in the economy,
albeit dierently. A measure of total demand on a set of goods is obtained by counting the
number of exclusive demanders of these goods in the notion of sets of overdemanded goods
and by counting the number of demanders of these goods in the notion of sets of underde-
manded goods. However, the dummy good is never part of a set of overdemanded goods and
zero priced goods, which always includes the dummy good, are never part of sets of under-
demanded goods. In some sense, the existence of sets of overdemanded (underdemanded)
goods at a price vector indicates that there is excess demand (supply) in the economy. Since
both overdemanded and underdemanded sets of goods may exist at a given price vector,
excess demand and excess supply can exist simultaneously in the economy.
3There is a small dierence between our denition of underdemanded goods and the denition in
Sotomayor (2002). Sotomayor (2002) assumes the existence of a dummy buyer who demands every good
with zero price and who can be allocated more than one good. Then, a set of goods S is underdemanded
in Sotomayor (2002) at a price vector p if every good in N is demanded by a buyer (may be the dummy
buyer), S  N+(p), and #U(S;p) < #S.
5Goods
Buyers 0 1 2
1 0 8 4
2 0 6 3
3 0 1 1
Table 1: An Illustrating Example
p D1(p) D2(p) D3(p) OD UD Weakly OD Weakly UD
(0;0;0) f1g f1g f1;2g f1g;f1;2g ; f1g;f1;2g ;
(0; 
2;) f1g f1g f1g f1g;f1;2g f2g f1g;f1;2g f2g
(0;;3 + ) f1g f1g f1g f1g;f1;2g f2g f1g;f1;2g f2g
(0;4;1) f1g f1;2g f0;2g ; ; f1g;f1;2g ;
(0;4   ;1 + ) f1g f1g f0g f1g f2g f1g;f1;2g f2g;f1;2g
(0;5;) f2g f2g f2g f2g;f1;2g f1g f2g;f1;2g f1g
(0;5;2) f1g f1;2g f0g ; ; f1g;f1;2g f2g;f1;2g
(0;5;2 + ) f1g f1g f0g f1g f2g f1g;f1;2g f2g;f1;2g
(0;6;1 + ) f2g f2g f0g f2g f1g f2g;f1;2g f1g;f1;2g
(0;6;4) f1g f0;1g f0g ; f2g f1g f2g;f1;2g
(0;7;3) f1;2g f0;2g f0g ; ; ; f1g;f1;2g
(0;7 + ;) f2g f2g f2g f2g;f1;2g f1g f2g;f1;2g f1g
(0;8;2) f2g f2g f0g f2g f1g f2g;f1;2g f1g;f1;2g
(0;7 + ;3 + ) f1;2g f0g f0g ; f1;2g ; f1g;f2g;f1;2g
Table 2: Illustration of overdemand (OD) and underdemand (UD) for the example in Table
1
We give an example to illustrate these notions. Suppose there are three buyers and two
goods. Valuations of buyers are given in Table 1. The minimum WE price vector for the
example in Table 1 is pmin = (0;4;1). The maximum WE price vector for the example in
Table 1 is pmax = (0;7;3). In Table 2, we give various price vectors and describe our notions
at those price vectors. In the table it holds that 0 <  < 1.
The following insights from Table 2 are worth noting.
 At price vector (0;0;0) no set of goods is underdemanded since N+((0;0;0)) = ;. But
sets of underdemanded goods may exist at low price vectors (for example good 2 is
underdemanded at price vector (0; 
2;)). In general, the existence of sets of underde-
manded or overdemanded goods depends on the relative prices of goods, in addition
to the entire price vector.
 Price vectors (0;4;1), (0;5;2) and (0;7;3) are WE price vectors. No set of goods is
overdemanded and no set of goods is underdemanded at these price vectors. Moreover,
6at the minimum WE price vector (0;4;1) no set of goods is weakly underdemanded.
Similarly, at the maximum WE price vector (0;7;3) no set of goods is weakly overde-
manded. These are no coincidences. In Theorems 1, 2, and 3 we formalize these
relations of sets of overdemanded and underdemanded goods with WE price vectors.
 At low enough price vectors, we expect sets of overdemanded goods to exist. In Table
2, we see that at price vectors below the minimum WE price vector (4;1), there is
always an overdemanded set of goods. Similarly, at price vectors above the maximum
WE price vector (7;3) there is always an underdemanded set of goods. We formalize
these results in Corollaries 1 and 2.
4 Characterization Results
In this section, we give a characterization of the price vector space. Our characterization of
the WE price vectors is based on the notions of sets of overdemanded and underdemanded
goods. Further, together with the notions of sets of weakly overdemanded and weakly un-
derdemanded goods, we characterize the minimum and maximum WE price vectors and the
price vectors that are not WE price vectors.
Dene M+(p) = fi 2 M : 0 = 2 Di(p)g for any price vector p. Notice that M+(p) =
O(N n f0g;p). Now, consider the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 Suppose no set of goods is overdemanded. Then there exists a feasible allocation
in which every buyer is assigned a good from his demand set.
Proof: Since N n f0g is not overdemanded, #(N n f0g)  #O(N n f0g;p) = #M+(p).
Consider S  M+(p). Let T = [i2SDi(p). Since 0 = 2 T and T is not overdemanded, we
get #T  #O(T;p)  #S. Using Hall's theorem (Hall, 1935), there is a feasible allocation
in which every buyer i in M+(p) can be assigned a good in Di(p), and every buyer in
M n M+(p) can be assigned the dummy good 0, which is in his demand set. 
Lemma 2 Suppose no set of goods is underdemanded. Then there exists a feasible allocation
in which every good in N+(p) is assigned to a buyer who is a demander of that good.
Proof: Since N+(p) is not underdemanded, #N+(p)  #U(N+(p);p)  #M. Consider
T  N+(p). Let S = U(T;p). Since T is not underdemanded, #T  #U(T;p) = #S. Using
Hall's theorem (Hall, 1935), there is a feasible allocation in which every good in N+(p) can
be assigned to a buyer who is a demander of that good, and the remaining buyers can be
assigned the dummy good. 
The absence of only overdemanded or only underdemanded sets of goods cannot guarantee
a WE price vector. For instance, consider an example with a single good and three buyers
7with values 10, 6, and 3. A WE price is any price between 6 and 10. At any price higher than
10, the good is not overdemanded but it is not a WE price. Similarly, at any price between 3
and 6, the good is not underdemanded but it is not a WE price. In some sense, Lemma 1 says
that condition (WE-1) in Denition 1 is satised in the absence of overdemanded goods,
but condition (WE-2) may be violated. Similarly, Lemma 2 says that condition (WE-2) in
Denition 1 is satised in the absence of underdemanded goods, but condition (WE-1) may
be violated. However, the WE prices can be precisely characterized by the absence of both
overdemanded and underdemanded sets of goods.
Theorem 1 A price vector p is a WE price vector if and only if no set of goods is overde-
manded and no set of goods is underdemanded at p.
Proof: Suppose p is a WE price vector. By condition (WE-2), there exists a feasible
allocation in which every good in N+(p) can be assigned to a unique demander of that
good. Hence no set of goods is underdemanded. If some set of goods, say, S  N n f0g, is
overdemanded, then condition (WE-1) will fail for some buyer in O(S;p) in every feasible
allocation, which is not true since p is a WE price vector. Hence no set of goods can be
overdemanded.
Suppose now that no set of goods is overdemanded and no set of goods is underdemanded
at price vector p. By Lemma 1 there is a non-empty set of feasible allocations   that
allocates every buyer a good from his demand set. Choose an allocation  2   for which
the number of goods from N+(p) that is allocated in  is maximal over all the allocations in
 . Let us call such an allocation a maximal allocation in  . Let T 0 = fj 2 N+(p) : i 6=
j 8 i 2 Mg. If T 0 = ;, then by denition (p;) is a WE. We will show that T 0 is empty.
Assume for contradiction that T 0 is not empty.
We rst show that for every buyer i 2 M, if i = 2 N+(p) then T 0 \ Di(p) = ;. Assume
for contradiction for some i 2 M with i = 2 N+(p) there exists j 2 T 0 \Di(p). In that case,
we can construct a new allocation 0 in which 0
i = j and 0
k = k for all k 6= i. Allocation
0 is in   and assigns one good more from N+(p) than  does. This is a contradiction since
 is a maximal allocation in  . As a result of this, the demanders of T 0 are assigned to
goods in N+(p) n T 0. Let X0 = U(T 0;p). So, X0  fi 2 M : i 2 N+(p) n T 0g. Now, for
any k  0, consider a sequence (T 0;X0;T 1;X1;:::;T k;Xk), where for every 1  q  k, T q
is the set of goods assigned to buyers in Xq 1 in  and Xq = U([
q
r=0T r;p) n U([
q 1
r=0T r;p).
Note that by denition T q \ T r = ; for every q 6= r.
We show that if T q 6= ; and T q  N+(p) for all 0  q  k, then there exists T k+1 6= ;
such that T k+1  N+(p) and T k+1\T q = ; for all 0  q  k. By denition of Xq, 0  q  k,
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Using equations (1) and (2), we get #Xk  #T 0. Since T 0 is non-empty, Xk is non-empty.
Dene T k+1 as the set of goods assigned to buyers in Xk in . Hence T k+1 is non-empty.
By denition T k+1 \ T q = ; for every 0  q  k. To show that T k+1  N+(p), assume for
contradiction that there exists a buyer ik 2 Xk such that ik = 2 N+(p). By denition of Xk,
ik should demand some good jk 2 T k. Now consider the sequence (ik;jk;ik 1;jk 1;:::;i0;j0),
where for every 0  q  k 1, iq 1 is the buyer assigned to good jq in  (note that iq 1 2 Xq 1
by denition) and jq 1 is a good demanded by iq 1 from T q 1 (such a good exists by the
denition of Xq 1 and T q 1). Now, construct an allocation 0 with 0
iq = jq for all 0  q  k
and 0
i = i for any i = 2 fi0;:::;ikg. Clearly, 0 2  . By assigning ik to jk, 0 assigns one
good more from N+(p) than  does, contradicting the fact that  is a maximal allocation in
 . Hence T k+1  N+(p). This process can be repeated innitely many times starting from
T 0. So (T 0;T 1;:::) is an innite sequence such that T q \ T r = ; for every q 6= r, T q 6= ; for
all q, and T q  N+(p) for all q. This is a contradiction since N+(p) is nite. So, T 0 = ;,
and therefore (p;) is a WE. 
The characterization in Theorem 1 shows that given a price vector and the demand sets
of buyers, it is possible to check if the given price vector is a WE price vector by checking
for the existence of overdemanded and underdemanded sets of goods. In some sense this is
a generalization of Hall's theorem (Hall, 1935) for our model.
In contrast to Denition 1, the characterization in Theorem 1 does not require to compute
a feasible allocation to check if a price vector is a WE price vector. Theorem 1 uses only
demand set information of buyers to characterize the WE price vectors. Further, it enables
us to characterize the minimum and the maximum WE price vectors (Theorems 2 and 3).
Notice that absence of overdemanded goods requires that there is no excess demand in
a weak sense, since we only count the exclusive demanders in checking for overdemanded
goods. Similarly, absence of underdemanded goods requires that there is no excess supply
in a weak sense, since zero priced goods are not counted while checking for underdemanded
9goods. Theorem 1 assures the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium at a price vector if there
is neither excess demand nor excess supply. This provides a direct economic interpretation
of our result.
Given the lattice structure of the set of WE price vectors, one is tempted to think that a
precise characterization of the minimum and maximum WE price vectors is possible, where
we relax the notions of excess demand and excess supply. We do this in the next two
theorems. In some sense, these theorems provide further generalizations of Hall's theorem
for our model.
Theorem 2 A price vector p is equal to pmin if and only if there is no overdemanded set of
goods and no weakly underdemanded set of goods at p.
Proof: Suppose p = pmin. By Theorem 1, no set of goods is overdemanded at p. We
need to show that no set of goods is weakly underdemanded. Assume for contradiction
that a set of goods, say, S  N, is weakly underdemanded. By denition S  N+(p) and
#U(S;p)  #S. Since p is a WE price vector, every good in S is assigned to a buyer in
his demand set at price vector p. So, #U(S;p)  #S. This implies that #U(S;p) = #S.
Since S  N+(p), we can decrease the price of goods in S by a suciently small amount
so that no buyer in M n U(S;p) demands a good from S. Buyers in U(S;p) will continue
to demand goods from S after such a price decrease. Thus, the new price vector is a WE
price vector, and is smaller than p = pmin. This is a contradiction since pmin is the unique
minimum WE price vector.
Now, we assume that no set of goods is overdemanded and no set of goods is weakly
underdemanded at a price vector p. Applying Theorem 1, p is a WE price vector. Assume
for contradiction that p 6= pmin. By denition of pmin, pj  pmin
j for all j 2 N and there
exists a set of goods S = fj 2 N : pj > pmin
j g. By our assumption S 6= ;. For all j 2 S, it
holds that pj > pmin
j  0, implying S  N+(p). Because S is not weakly underdemanded,
#U(S;p) > #S: (3)
Since prices of goods in S strictly decrease from p to pmin but remain the same for goods in
N nS, buyers in U(S;p) will only demand goods from S at price vector pmin. Using equation
(3), we can write #O(S;pmin)  #U(S;p) > #S. This means S is overdemanded at price
vector pmin. This is a contradiction by Theorem 1. 
At a WE price vector, every good with positive price is allocated to some demander of
that good. Hence, the number of demanders of such a set of positive price goods is at least
equal to the number of goods in that set. Absence of weakly underdemanded goods at a
WE price vector implies that for a set of goods with positive price, there is some buyer not
allocated to these goods who demands a good from that set. This provides an alternate
interpretation of Theorem 2. Also, the characterization of the minimum WE price vector
gives us an idea about the existence of overdemanded and weakly underdemanded sets of
goods in other regions of price vector space.
10Corollary 1 If p  pmin, then there exists an overdemanded set of goods. Further, if
p  pmin, then there exists a weakly underdemanded set of goods.
Proof: Suppose p  pmin. Let S = fj 2 N : pj < pmin
j g. Since p  pmin, S 6= ;. Further,
because pmin
j > pj  0 for all j 2 S, S  N+(pmin). Since prices of goods in S decrease
from pmin to p while prices of goods in N n S do not decrease, U(S;pmin)  O(S;p). So,
#O(S;p)  #U(S;pmin) > #S, where the last inequality follows from Theorem 2 (S is not
weakly underdemanded at pmin). Hence S is overdemanded at p.
Now, suppose p  pmin. Dene S0 = fj 2 N : pj > pmin
j g. Because p  pmin, S0 6= ;.
Further, since pj > pmin
j  0 for all j 2 S0, S0  N+(p). Since prices of goods in S0 decrease
from p to pmin while prices of goods in N n S0 do not decrease, U(S0;p)  O(S0;pmin). So,
#U(S0;p)  #O(S0;pmin)  #S0, where the last inequality follows from Theorem 2 (S0 is
not overdemanded at pmin). Hence S0 is weakly underdemanded at p. 
In every region of the price vector space with respect to pmin, Corollary 1 shows if an
overdemanded set of goods or a weakly underdemanded set of goods always exists in that
region.
To identify regions in the price vector space where underdemanded goods and weakly
overdemanded goods can be guaranteed, we give a characterization of the maximum WE
price vector.
Theorem 3 A price vector p is equal to pmax if and only if there is no weakly overdemanded
set of goods and no underdemanded set of goods at p.
Proof: Let p = pmax. By Theorem 1, no set of goods is underdemanded. We will show
that no set of goods is weakly overdemanded. Assume for contradiction that for some
; 6= S  N n f0g, S is weakly overdemanded. So, #O(S;p)  #S. Since p is a WE price
vector, S cannot be overdemanded. Hence, #O(S;p) = #S. By denition of WE, any WE
allocation should assign buyers in O(S;p) goods from S. Since buyers in O(S;p) do not
demand the dummy good, their payo is positive. Hence, by increasing the price of goods in
S by a suciently small amount, buyers in O(S;p) will continue to demand the same goods
in S at the higher price, and we will reach a higher WE price vector. This is a contradiction
since p = pmax is the unique maximum WE price vector.
Now, assume that no set of goods is weakly overdemanded and no set of goods is un-
derdemanded at p. Using Theorem 1, p is a WE price vector. Assume for contradiction
p 6= pmax. By denition of pmax, pj  pmax
j for all j 2 N and there exists a non-empty set
of goods S = fj 2 N : pj < pmax
j g. Since S is not weakly overdemanded at p, we can write
#O(S;p) < #S: (4)
By increasing prices from p to pmax, prices of goods in N n S do not increase but prices
of goods in S increase. This means buyers in M n O(S;p) will not have goods from S in
11their demand set at pmax. Using equation (4) we can write #U(S;pmax)  #O(S;p) < #S.
Since prices of goods in S increase, S  N+(pmax). Hence, S is underdemanded at pmax.
This is a contradiction. 
Consider a WE price vector and a set of goods that are allocated in that WE. If this
set of goods is not weakly overdemanded, then some of the buyers allocated to these goods
must demand a good not in this set of goods. This provides an alternate interpretation of
Theorem 3. Analogous to Corollary 1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2 If p  pmax, then there exists a weakly overdemanded set of goods. Further, if
p  pmax, then there exists an underdemanded set of goods.
Proof: The proof is analogous to Corollary 1 except that we make use of Theorem 3 instead























Price of Good 1
Price of Good 2
No OD goods and no WUD goods No UD goods and no WOD goods
WOD
No OD goods and no UD goods (WE price vectors)
Figure 1: Various regions of the price vector space for the example in Table 1
The results in the paper so far are illustrated in Figure 1 for the example in Table 1.
The labelling in various regions of the gure indicates whether (weakly) overdemanded sets
of goods ((W)OD) and (weakly) underdemanded sets of goods ((W)UD) exist at all price
vectors in these regions. By Theorem 1, there is no set of overdemanded and underdemanded
goods in the lattice corresponding to the WE price vector region in Figure 1. The minimum
and the maximum WE price vectors are characterized by Theorems 2 and 3, respectively. The
other regions in Figure 1 are labelled using Corollaries 1 and 2. For example, for every price
vector in the upper-right corner, an underdemanded set of goods exist, whereas for every
12price vector in the lower-left corner, an overdemanded set of goods exist. The reader can also
see how dierent price vectors in Table 2 lie in various regions of Figure 1. Notice that once
every set of goods is weakly underdemanded, then no set of goods can be overdemanded.
This happens, for example when all prices are set equal or above the highest valuation of
the goods. Also, there exist regions (upper-left and lower-right corners in Figure 1) where
sets of underdemanded and overdemanded goods co-exist.
We can say something more about various price vectors than what the results in Corol-
laries 1 and 2 seem to indicate. If we decrease the prices of positive price goods at the
minimum WE price vector by an equal amount such that no price goes below zero, then at
the new price vector no weakly underdemanded goods exist. But, by Corollary 1, some set of
goods is overdemanded. So, if pmin 6= 0, then there is some non-zero price vector p  pmin
where no set of goods is weakly underdemanded but some set of goods is overdemanded.
This argument illustrates that we can draw a piecewise linear path from the minimum WE
price vector to the zero price vector along which no set of goods is weakly underdemanded
but some set of goods is overdemanded.
Similarly, if we increase the prices of positive price goods by an equal amount from the
maximum WE price vector, no set of goods is weakly overdemanded at the new price vector,
but some set of goods is underdemanded. So, the 45 degree straight line from the maximum
WE price vector in the north-east direction is a set of (innite) price vectors where no set
of goods is weakly overdemanded but some set of goods is underdemanded.
Our earlier results do not say anything about the structure of the sets of overdemanded
and underdemanded goods. In Table 2, we can see that a good can be both part of an
overdemanded set of goods and an underdemanded set of goods at some price vector, e.g.
at price vector (0;;3 + ), good 2 is underdemanded, and is also in the overdemanded
set f1;2g. But this anomaly is absent if we consider minimal overdemanded and minimal
underdemanded sets of goods. The following theorem reconciles these ideas.
Theorem 4 If a good is part of a minimal overdemanded set of goods at a price vector,
then it cannot be part of a minimal weakly underdemanded set of goods at that price vector.
Similarly, if a good is part of a minimal weakly overdemanded set of goods at a price vector,
then it cannot be part of a minimal underdemanded set of goods at that price vector.
Proof: Consider any price vector p. Let Su be a minimal weakly underdemanded set of
goods and let So be a minimal overdemanded set of goods at the price vector p. We will show
that Su\So = ;. Since Su is weakly underdemanded at p, #O(Su;p)  #U(Su;p)  #Su.
This shows that Su is not overdemanded at p. So, Su 6= So. Assume for contradiction
Su \ So 6= ;. There are three cases to consider.
Case 1: So ( Su. Since Su is minimal weakly underdemanded at p and Su n So is


























The last inequality comes from the fact that O(So;p) [ U(Su n So;p)  U(Su;p). Using
equation (5), we get a contradiction.
Case 2: Su ( So. Since So is minimal overdemanded and So n Su is not empty, So n Su


















The last inequality comes from the fact that O(So;p)  O(So n Su;p) [ U(Su;p). Using
equation (8), we get a contradiction.
Case 3: Su \So = T, T 6= Su, T 6= So, and T is non-empty. Since Su is minimal weakly
underdemanded, Su n T is not weakly underdemanded. This gives us
#U(S
u n T;p) > #(S
u n T): (9)
Similarly, So n T is not overdemanded, which gives us
#O(S
o n T;p)  #(S
o n T): (10)
Denote Y = O(So;p) n O(So n T;p). From the denition of Y , every buyer in Y demands
goods from So only but at least some good from T. Hence, Y \ U(Su n T;p) = ;. This




u n T;p) + #Y
> #(S









The last inequality follow from the fact that T ( So and T ( Su. It implies that Su is
not weakly underdemanded. This is a contradiction.
Using an analogous proof, it can be shown that if a good is part of a minimal weakly
overdemanded set of goods, then it cannot be part of a minimal underdemanded set of goods.

5 Implications of Characterization Results
Our characterizations, besides being of theoretical interest, has some implications in some
practical applications. These applications mainly arise in contexts where the minimum or the
maximum WE price vector is used to price the goods. We describe some of these applications
below, and implications of our characterization result in these applications.
5.1 Marginal Economies
Marginal economies, in which either a single buyer or a single good is removed from the
original economy, play a vital role in various game theoretic solutions. For example, the
payment of a buyer in the VCG mechanism can be computed by analyzing the marginal
economy corresponding to that buyer. Also, marginal payo vectors are focal point of many
cooperative game solutions (e.g., the Shapley value).
In general, we denote an economy with goods A  N with 0 2 A and buyers B  M
as E(A;B) (i.e., only goods in A and buyers in B are present). Denote as pmin(A;B)
and pmax(A;B) the minimum and the maximum WE price vectors of economy E(A;B),
respectively. Also, for any price vector p 2 R
jAj
+ the vector of components of p except the
jth component pj is denoted as p j. Using our earlier results we show next how the lattice
of WE price vectors shifts in marginal economies.
Theorem 5 For every A  N with 0 2 A and B  M,
(a) pmin(A;B n fig)  pmin(A;B)  pmax(A;B n fig)  pmax(A;B) for all i 2 B,
(b) pmin
 j (A;B)  pmin(A n fjg;B)  pmax
 j (A;B)  pmax(A n fjg;B) for all j 2 A.
15Proof: Proof of (a): For some i 2 B, consider the marginal economy E(A;B n fig). By
Theorem 2, no set of goods is overdemanded and no set of goods is weakly underdemanded
at pmin(A;B) in economy E(A;B). By removing buyer i, no set of goods is overdemanded at
pmin(A;B) in economy E(A;Bnfig). Now, consider a set of goods S which has positive prices
in pmin(A;B). Since S is not weakly underdemanded, we can write #B(S;pmin(A;B)) >
#S, and so #B(S;pmin(A;B))  #S + 1. In economy E(A;B n fig) the demand of buyers
in B n fig do not change at pmin(A;B). Hence the number of demanders of S in economy
E(A;B n fig) is equal to #B(S;pmin(A;B))   1  #S. Hence S is not underdemanded at
pmin(A;B) in economy E(A;B n fig). Since no set of goods is overdemanded and no set of
goods is underdemanded at pmin(A;B) in economy E(A;B nfig), pmin(A;B) is a WE price
vector of economy E(A;B n fig) (due to Theorem 1). By the lattice structure of the WE
price vector space, we get that pmin(A;B n fig)  pmin(A;B)  pmax(A;B n fig).
By Theorem 3, no set of goods is weakly overdemanded and no set of of goods is un-
derdemanded at pmax(A;B) in economy E(A;B). By removing a buyer i 2 B, no set of
goods is weakly overdemanded at pmax(A;B) in economy E(A;B n fig). By Corollary 2,
pmax(A;B n fig)  pmax(A;B).
Proof of (b): For some j 2 A, consider the marginal economy E(A n fjg;B). By
Theorem 3, no set of goods is underdemanded and no set of goods is weakly overdemanded
at pmax(A;B) in economy E(A;B). By removing a good j no set of goods is underdemanded
in economy E(A n fjg;B) at pmax
 j (A;B). Now consider S  (A n fj;0g). Let K be the
exclusive demanders of S at pmax
 j (A;B) in economy E(A n fjg;B). Buyers who are the
exclusive demanders of S [ fjg at pmax(A;B) in economy E(A;B) are the buyers from K
plus the exclusive demanders of good j. With respect to economy E(A;B), we can write
#O(S[fjg;pmax(A;B)) = #O(fjg;pmax(A;B))+#K < #S+1 (since S[fjg is not weakly
overdemanded at pmax(A;B)). Since fjg is not weakly overdemanded at pmax(A;B), we get
#O(fjg;pmax(A;B)) = 0. Therefore, #K < #S + 1, and so #K  #S. Hence S is not
overdemanded at pmax
 j (A;B) in economy E(A n fjg;B). By Theorem 1, pmax
 j (A;B) is a
WE price vector of economy E(A n fjg;B). By the lattice structure of the set of WE price
vectors, we get pmin(A n fjg;B)  pmax
 j (A;B)  pmax(A n fjg;B).
By Theorem 2, no set of goods is weakly underdemanded at pmin(A;B) in economy
E(A;B). By removing a good j 2 A, no set of goods is weakly underdemanded at pmin
 j (A;B)
in economy E(A n fjg;B). By Corollary 1, pmin
 j (A;B)  pmin(A n fjg;B). 
We remark that part of Theorem 5 is proved in Gul and Stacchetti (1999) (Theorem 7
in their paper). In a general model where buyers have gross substitutes valuation functions,
which is satised in our model, Gul and Stacchetti (1999) show that for all A  N, and
for all B  M: (a) pmin(A;B n fig)  pmin(A;B) and pmax(A;B n fig)  pmax(A;B) for
all i 2 B; (b) pmin
 j (A;B)  pmin(A n fjg;B) and pmax
 j (A;B)  pmax(A n fjg;B) for all
j 2 A. Our results in Theorem 5 are more general than this for the unit demand setting, in
the sense that we also show that pmin(A;B) is a WE price vector of economy E(A;B n fig)
16for all i 2 B and pmax
 j (A;B) is a WE price vector of economy E(A n fjg;B) for all j 2 A.
This is not valid for the general model with gross substitutes valuations. Moreover, our
proofs use the characterization results above and are very dierent from the proofs given in
Gul and Stacchetti (1999).
As a corollary to Theorem 5, we have the following result (Corollary 3 is essentially the
new contribution of Theorem 5 with respect to Gul and Stacchetti (1999)).
Corollary 3 Consider any A  N with 0 2 A and B  M. pmin(A;B) is a WE price vector
of economy E(A;B n fig) for all i 2 B and pmax
 j (A;B) is a WE price vector of economy
E(A n fjg;B) for all j 2 A.
To summarize Theorem 5, by removing a buyer from the economy (essentially reducing
demand), the WE price vector lattice shifts downwards. Similarly, by removing a good from
the economy (essentially reducing supply), the WE price vector lattice shifts upwards (in
a dimension that is one less than the dimension of the original lattice). So, the standard
intuitions of economics that prices decrease with lowering of demand and increase with
lowering of supply continue to hold in our model.
Connections between WE price vectors and the VCG payments of buyers can be made
using Corollary 3. To remind, the VCG mechanism chooses an ecient allocation and asks
every buyer to pay his externality on other buyers. This allocation and payment scheme
makes it a strategy-proof and ecient mechanism. It can be shown, using standard lin-
ear programming duality arguments, that if pmin(N;M) is a WE price vector of economy
E(N;M) and therefore by Corollary 3 also a WE price vector of the marginal economy
E(N;M nfig) for every i 2 M, then the VCG payment of every buyer i 2 M is pmin
i (M;N),
where  is an ecient allocation of economy E(M;N) (Leonard, 1983). This proves that
payments in a Walrasian equilibrium corresponding to the minimum Walrasian price vector
are precisely the VCG payments of buyers. But we can also relate the VCG payment of a
buyer to the maximum WE price vector of a marginal economy corresponding to that buyer
using Corollary 3.
Proposition 1 For every buyer i 2 M it holds that his VCG payment is equal to pmax
i (N;Mn
fig), where  is an ecient allocation chosen by the VCG mechanism.
Proof: For any A  N with 0 2 A and B  M, dene V (A;B) as the total value of the
buyers in an ecient allocation of economy E(A;B) and let P(B;p) be the total payo of
the buyers in B at price vector p. If p is a WE price vector of economy E(A;B), then
V (A;B) = P(B;p) +
P
j2A pj (this can be deduced from standard linear programming
arguments, see for example Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002)). Now, consider an ecient
allocation  of economy E(N;M). The claim clearly holds for buyer i 2 M if i = 0. For
17i 6= 0, the VCG payment of buyer i 2 M can be written as
p
V CG
i = V (N;M n fig)   V (N n fig;M n fig)
= P(M n fig;p





j (N;M n fig)
  P(M n fig;p





j (N;M n fig)
= p
max
i (N;M n fig);
since by Corollary 3 it holds that pmax
 i (N;M n fig) is a WE price vector of economy
E(N n fig;M n fig). 
Since the VCG payments correspond to pmin(N;M), we have the following corollary of
Proposition 1.
Corollary 4 Let  be an ecient allocation of economy E(N;M). Then pmin
i (N;M) =
pmax
i (N;M n fig) for all i 2 M, and pmin
j (N;M) = 0 for all j 2 N that is unassigned in .
Proposition 1 gives an alternative interpretation of the VCG payment of a buyer. The
VCG payment of a buyer is the maximum payment that can be received in a WE in the
marginal economy without him for the good assigned to him in the VCG mechanism. Corol-
lary 4 relates the minimum WE price vector of an economy to the maximum WE price
vector of its marginal economies corresponding to buyers. Such a relationship between the
maximum WE price vector and the minimum WE price vector of marginal economies corre-
sponding to goods does not hold. This can be veried from the example in Table 1.
5.2 Existing Iterative Auctions
Iterative auctions, where prices monotonically increase (ascending auctions) or decrease
(descending auctions) are practical and transparent methods to sell goods. The design
of iterative auctions for our model has been studied earlier - ascending auctions can be
found in Demange et al. (1986) and Sankaran (1994), whereas descending auctions can be
found in Sotomayor (2002) and Mishra and Veeramani (2006) 4. These auctions termi-
nate at a WE price vector - the auctions in Demange et al. (1986), Sankaran (1994), and
Mishra and Veeramani (2006) terminate at the minimum WE price vector, while the auc-
tion in Sotomayor (2002) terminates at the maximum WE price vector 5. Moreover, the
underlying price adjustment in these auctions is based on the ideas of overdemanded and
4The auction in Mishra and Veeramani (2006) is an ascending auction for a procurement (production)
economy. An ascending auction in a procurement economy translates to a descending auction in our model.
5Since minimum WE price vector corresponds to the VCG payments, the auctions in Demange et al.
(1986), Sankaran (1994), and Mishra and Veeramani (2006) have truthful bidding in an equilibrium, whereas
buyers can manipulate the auction in Sotomayor (2002).
18underdemanded sets of goods. Interestingly, the papers on ascending auctions do not talk
about underdemanded sets of goods and use the notion overdemanded sets of goods only.
Similarly, the papers on descending auctions do not talk about overdemanded sets of goods
and use the notion of (weakly) underdemanded sets of goods only. The terminating con-
ditions in these auctions are absence of overdemanded sets of goods for ascending auctions
and absence of underdemanded sets of goods for descending auctions. Still, these auctions
terminate at an extreme WE price vector. Our results can be used to explain why this is
possible. In the rest of this section, we assume valuations of buyers and prices to be integers.
Consider the following class of ascending auctions:
S0 Start the auction at a price vector p where no set of goods is weakly underdemanded
(by Corollary 1, p  pmin);
S1 Collect demand sets of buyers and check if an overdemanded set of goods exist;
S2 If no overdemanded set of goods exist, then stop (by Theorem 2, this is the minimum
WE price vector);
S3 Else increase prices of goods such that no set of goods is weakly underdemanded at
the new price vector, and repeat from Step (S1).
The auctions in Demange et al. (1986) and Sankaran (1994) are such auctions, though
they do not mention this explicitly. Both these auctions start from the zero price vector 6. At
the zero price vector, no set of goods is weakly underdemanded. In Step (S3), Demange et al.
(1986) increase prices by unity for goods in a minimal overdemanded set, whereas Sankaran
(1994) increases prices by unity for goods in an overdemanded set, which he nds using a
labeling algorithm of graph theory. Both the price adjustments ensure that no set of goods
is weakly underdemanded after the price increase (i.e., satisfy Step (S3)), and we stay below
the minimum WE price vector (by Corollary 1).
The descending auctions share an analogous feature. Consider the following class of
descending auctions:
S0 Start the auction at a price vector p where no set of goods is weakly overdemanded
(by Corollary 2, p  pmax);
S1 Collect demand sets of buyers and check if an underdemanded set of goods exist;
S2 If no underdemanded set of goods exist, then stop (by Theorem 3, this is the maximum
WE price vector);
S3 Else decrease prices of goods such that no set of goods is weakly overdemanded at the
new price vector, and repeat from Step (S1).
6To be precise, they use the reserve price of every good as the starting price, which is assumed to be zero
in our model.
19The auction in Sotomayor (2002) starts from a very high price vector where every buyer
demands only the dummy good. Hence no set of goods is weakly overdemanded. By de-
creasing prices by unity for goods in a minimal underdemanded set, no set of goods is weakly
overdemanded after the price decrease, and the price in the auction stays above the maximum
WE price vector.
This class of descending auctions can be modied to terminate at the minimum WE price
vector. Such auctions have to start from a price vector where no set of goods is overdemanded
(by Corollary 2 such a price vector is above the minimum WE price vector). These auctions
should stop if no set of goods is weakly underdemanded, and price decrease should be such
that no set of goods is overdemanded at the new price vector.
Thus, our characterization results unify the existing iterative auctions by bringing them
under a broad class of auctions. We hope that this will be useful in identifying more iterative
auctions from this class which are easier to implement in practice than the auctions known
in the literature.
Finaly, a note on the incentive properties of these auctions. It is well known that submit-
ting true demand sets in each iteration of ascending and descending auctions that terminate
at the minimum WE price vector is an ex post Nash equilibrium (Bikhchandani et al., 2002).
This can be reconciled from the fact that the minimum WE price vector corresponds to the
VCG payments of buyers in our setting (Leonard, 1983). Hence, all auctions discussed in
this section that terminate at the minimum WE price vector share this incentive property.
6 Conclusions
We characterize the Walrasian equilibrium price vectors for economies with indivisible goods
and unit demand. Our characterizations are based on the notions of overdemanded sets of
goods and underdemanded sets of goods. These notions also lead to characterizations of
extreme points of the Walrasian equilibrium price vector space. As a consequence of these
characterizations, we are able to classify the space of price vectors into regions where (weakly)
overdemanded and (weakly) underdemanded goods are guaranteed to exist. We discuss some
implications of such a classication, including how the space of Walrasian equilibrium price
vectors looks in marginal economies and how it forms the underlying basis of iterative auction
design.
A generalization of our characterizations, for settings where buyers can be assigned more
than one good, is a useful direction of future research. However, Walrasian equilibrium
may fail to exist in such general settings, except under specic types of valuations called
gross substitutes valuations (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999). Gross substitutes valuations not
only ensure existence of Walrasian equilibrium, but also ensure that the space of Walrasian
equilibrium price vectors form a lattice (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999). Under gross substitutes
valuations, the concept of overdemanded goods has been generalized in Gul and Stacchetti
(2000), where they design ascending auctions using this concept. It remains to be seen
20whether our characterizations can be extended to gross substitutes valuations.
Another line of future research is to identify specic auctions from the broad class of
auctions described in Section 5.2, and compare them (say in terms of computation and
communication overhead or some parameter that is relevant in practice) with the existing
auctions in the literature.
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Abstract
We study an economy where a collection of indivisible goods are sold to a set of
buyers who want to buy at most one good. We characterize the set of Walrasian
equilibrium price vectors in such an economy using sets of overdemanded and underde-
manded goods. Further, we give characterizations for the minimum and the maximum
Walrasian equilibrium price vectors of this economy. Using our characterizations, we
give a sucient set of rules that generates a broad class of ascending and descending
auctions in which truthful bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium.
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11 Introduction
The classical Arrow-Debreu model (Arrow and Debreu, 1954) for studying competitive equi-
librium assumes goods to be divisible (commodities). But economies with indivisible goods
are common in many types of markets such as housing markets, job markets, and auctions
with goods like spectrum licenses. This paper investigates economies with indivisible goods
under the assumption that buyers have unit demand, i.e., every buyer can buy at most one
good. The unit demand assumption is common, for example, in settings of housing and job
markets.
In case of quasi-linear utilities of buyers, the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium is
guaranteed, and the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors form a complete lattice
(Shapley and Shubik, 1972). In this work, we characterize the Walrasian equilibrium price
vectors using the notions of overdemanded and underdemanded sets of goods. A set of goods
is (weakly) overdemanded at a price vector if the number of buyers who demand goods only
from that set is greater than (or equal to) the number of goods in that set. A set of goods
is (weakly) underdemanded at a price vector if their prices are positive and the number of
buyers who demand goods from that set is less than (or equal to) the number of goods in
that set. Our rst result is that a price vector is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector if
and only if there is no set of overdemanded and underdemanded goods at that price vector.
Since overdemanded goods indicate the presence of excess demand and underdemand goods
indicate the presence of excess supply, our characterization re
ects the intuition that a price
vector is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector if and only if there is no excess supply and no
excess demand.
The notion of overdemanded and underdemanded sets of goods has been studied in the
context of designing iterative auctions, where prices either increase monotonically (ascending
auctions) or decrease monotonically (descending auctions). Demange et al. (1986) use the
notion of overdemanded goods to design an ascending auction that terminates at the mini-
mum Walrasian equilibrium price vector. Analogously, Sotomayor (2002) uses the notion of
underdemanded goods, albeit a slightly dierent notion from ours, to design a descending
auction that terminates at the maximum Walrasian equilibrium price vector. Both papers,
however, do not make any connection between these notions.
Gul and Stacchetti (2000) consider a model where they allow a buyer to buy more than
one good and having gross substitutes valuations. In such a model, a Walrasian equilibrium
price vector is guaranteed to exist, and the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors form a
complete lattice (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999). For such a model, they provide a generalization
of Hall's theorem (Hall, 1935), which results in a necessary condition for a Walrasian equi-
librium (see Theorem 3 in Gul and Stacchetti (2000)). Therefore, they do not characterize
the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors, which is what we will do for our model. Also,
Hall's theorem is not enough to characterize the Walrasian equilibrium price vectors in our
model. We show that we can use Hall's theorem to guarantee only one of the two conditions
2required for a Walrasian equilibrium.
We will also characterize the minimum and the maximum Walrasian equilibrium price
vectors. A price vector is the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector if and only if no
set of goods is overdemanded and no set of goods is weakly underdemanded at this price
vector. Similarly, absence of sets of weakly overdemanded goods and underdemanded goods
completely characterizes the maximum Walrasian equilibrium price vector.
A motivation for this work is the growing literature on ascending combinatorial auc-
tions (Cramton et al., 2006). Ascending auctions are preferred over their sealed-bid counter-
parts for a variety of reasons. For the model considered in this work, an ascending auction
will typically maintain a price for every good, and monotonically increase them based on the
bids of buyers. The terminating condition in such ascending auctions is a Walrasian equi-
librium. Moreover, terminating at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector ensures
that truthful bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium for the bidders - this is a standard result
in this literature (see for example Bikhchandani et al. (2002)), and can be understood from
the fact that the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector corresponds to the payments
of the strategy-proof Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism in our model (Leonard, 1983). How-
ever, there are several algorithms, both Demange et al. (1986) and Sankaran (1994) describe
such methods, that can be interpreted as an ascending auction that terminates at the mini-
mum Walrasian equilibrium. An objective of this work is to give a broad class of ascending
and also descending auctions that terminate at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price
vector.
Using our main characterization results, we give a sucient set of rules that generates a
broad class of ascending and descending auctions. Our class of auctions include the ascending
auctions in Demange et al. (1986) and Sankaran (1994). Thus, our results unify the existing
ascending auctions in the literature. Further, we hope that our broad class of ascending and
descending auctions will be useful in identifying specic auctions in this class that are easier
to implement in practice than the existing auctions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formally describe the model.
Section 3 describes the concepts of overdemanded and underdemanded goods. Section 4 gives
the characterizations of the dierent regions of price vectors. In Section 5, we discuss some
implications of our characterization results, and we conclude in Section 6.
2 The Model
There is a set of indivisible goods N = f0;1;:::;ng for sale to a set of buyers M = f1;:::;mg.
Each buyer can be assigned to at most one good. The good 0 is a dummy good which can be
assigned to more than one buyer. The value of buyer i 2 M on good j 2 N is vij, assumed to
be a non-negative real number. Every buyer has zero value on the dummy good. A feasible
allocation  assigns every buyer i 2 M a good i 2 N such that no good in N n f0g is
assigned to more than one buyer. Note that a feasible allocation assigns every buyer a good
3(may be the dummy good), but some goods may not be assigned to any buyer. We say good
j 2 N is unassigned in  if there exists no buyer i 2 M with i = j. Let   be the set




i2M vii for all  2  .
A price vector p 2 R
n+1
+ assigns every good j 2 N a nonnegative price pj with p0 = 0.
We assume quasi-linear utilities. Given a price vector p, the payo of buyer i 2 M on
good j 2 N at price vector p is vij   pj. The demand set of buyer i at price vector p is
Di(p) = fj 2 N : vij   pj  vik   pk 8 k 2 Ng.
Denition 1 A Walrasian equilibrium (WE) is a price vector p and a feasible allocation
 such that
i 2 Di(p) for all i 2 M (WE-1)
and
pj = 0 for all j 2 N that are unassigned in : (WE-2)
If (p;) is a WE, then p is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector and  is a Wal-
rasian equilibrium allocation.
It is well known that every Walrasian equilibrium allocation is ecient (Shapley and Shubik,
1972). Moreover, the set of WE price vectors is non-empty 1, and forms a complete lattice
(Shapley and Shubik, 1972) 2. This implies the existence of a unique minimum WE price
vector (pmin) and a unique maximum WE price vector (pmax). Of all the WE price vectors,
pmin stands out since it corresponds to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) payments of buyers
assigned to them in a WE (Leonard, 1983). The VCG payment is dened as the externality
of a buyer on the remaining buyers (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973), and the VCG
mechanism is an ecient and strategy-proof mechanism. In this work, we aim to characterize
all WE price vectors, in particular pmin and pmax, and discuss its implications.
For any two price vectors p and p0 of equal dimension, we write p = p0 if pj = p0
j for all
j. If there exists a j at which pj 6= p0
j, then we write p 6= p0. If pj  p0
j for all j then we
write p  p0 or p0  p. If p  p0 but p 6= p, then we write p 
 p0 or p0  p. If there exists
some j for which pj < p0
j, then we write p  p0 or p0  p.
1The existence of a WE price vector follows from a standard linear programming duality argument and is
proved in Shapley and Shubik (1972). The ecient allocation problem can be written as a standard one-to-
one assignment problem, which always has an optimal solution (Leonard, 1983; Bikhchandani and Ostroy,
2002). So, the dual of such a linear program will also always have an optimal solution. Such optimal dual
solutions correspond to the WE price vectors (Bikhchandani and Ostroy, 2002). Moreover, conditions WE-1
and WE-2 are complementary slackness conditions corresponding to these primal and dual linear programs.
2We can see that the set of WE price vectors is a special type of lattice. Given a WE (p;), the inequalities
that dene this price vector are pj   pi  [vij   vii] for all i 2 M and for all j 2 N. These are lines in
two dimensions, and they are either parallel to one of the axes (since p0 = 0 for all price vectors) or at 45
degrees to both the axes in that dimension.
43 Overdemand and Underdemand
We dene demanders of a set of goods S  (N n f0g) at price vector p as U(S;p) = fi 2
M : Di(p) \ S 6= ;g. We dene the exclusive demanders of a set of goods S  (N n f0g)
at price vector p as O(S;p) = fi 2 M : Di(p)  Sg. Clearly, for every p and every
S  (N n f0g), we have O(S;p)  U(S;p). We denote the cardinality of a nite set S as
#S. Given a price vector p, dene N+(p) = fj 2 N : pj > 0g. By denition 0 = 2 N+(p) for
any p.
Denition 2 A set of goods S is overdemanded at price vector p if S  (N n f0g)
and #O(S;p) > #S. A set of goods S is weakly overdemanded at price vector p if
S  (N n f0g) and #O(S;p)  #S.
The notion of overdemanded sets of goods can be found in Demange et al. (1986) and
Sankaran (1994), who use it as a basis for the design of ascending auctions for the model of
our paper. For settings where a buyer can buy more than one good, the notion of overde-
manded goods has been generalized in Gul and Stacchetti (2000), de Vries et al. (2007), and
Mishra and Parkes (2007), who also use it as a basis for the design of ascending auctions for
general models.
Denition 3 A set of goods S is underdemanded at price vector p if S  N+(p) and
#U(S;p) < #S. A set of goods S is weakly underdemanded at price vector p if S 
N+(p) and #U(S;p)  #S.
The notion of underdemanded sets of goods can be found in Sotomayor (2002) 3, who
uses it to design descending auctions for our model.
Both concepts give us an idea about the imbalance of supply and demand in the economy,
albeit dierently. A measure of total demand on a set of goods is obtained by counting the
number of exclusive demanders of these goods in the notion of sets of overdemanded goods
and by counting the number of demanders of these goods in the notion of sets of underde-
manded goods. However, the dummy good is never part of a set of overdemanded goods and
zero priced goods, which always includes the dummy good, are never part of sets of under-
demanded goods. In some sense, the existence of sets of overdemanded (underdemanded)
goods at a price vector indicates that there is excess demand (supply) in the economy. Since
both overdemanded and underdemanded sets of goods may exist at a given price vector,
excess demand and excess supply can exist simultaneously in the economy.
3There is a small dierence between our denition of underdemanded goods and the denition in
Sotomayor (2002). Sotomayor (2002) assumes the existence of a dummy buyer who demands every good
with zero price and who can be allocated more than one good. Then, a set of goods S is underdemanded
in Sotomayor (2002) at a price vector p if every good in N is demanded by a buyer (may be the dummy
buyer), S  N+(p), and #U(S;p) < #S.
5Goods
Buyers 0 1 2
1 0 8 4
2 0 6 3
3 0 1 1
Table 1: An Illustrating Example
p D1(p) D2(p) D3(p) OD UD Weakly OD Weakly UD
(0;0;0) f1g f1g f1;2g f1g;f1;2g ; f1g;f1;2g ;
(0; 
2;) f1g f1g f1g f1g;f1;2g f2g f1g;f1;2g f2g
(0;;3 + ) f1g f1g f1g f1g;f1;2g f2g f1g;f1;2g f2g
(0;4;1) f1g f1;2g f0;2g ; ; f1g;f1;2g ;
(0;4   ;1 + ) f1g f1g f0g f1g f2g f1g;f1;2g f2g;f1;2g
(0;5;) f2g f2g f2g f2g;f1;2g f1g f2g;f1;2g f1g
(0;5;2) f1g f1;2g f0g ; ; f1g;f1;2g f2g;f1;2g
(0;5;2 + ) f1g f1g f0g f1g f2g f1g;f1;2g f2g;f1;2g
(0;6;1 + ) f2g f2g f0g f2g f1g f2g;f1;2g f1g;f1;2g
(0;6;4) f1g f0;1g f0g ; f2g f1g f2g;f1;2g
(0;7;3) f1;2g f0;2g f0g ; ; ; f1g;f1;2g
(0;7 + ;) f2g f2g f2g f2g;f1;2g f1g f2g;f1;2g f1g
(0;8;2) f2g f2g f0g f2g f1g f2g;f1;2g f1g;f1;2g
(0;7 + ;3 + ) f1;2g f0g f0g ; f1;2g ; f1g;f2g;f1;2g
Table 2: Illustration of overdemand (OD) and underdemand (UD) for the example in Table
1
We give an example to illustrate these notions. Suppose there are three buyers and two
goods. Valuations of buyers are given in Table 1. The minimum WE price vector for the
example in Table 1 is pmin = (0;4;1). The maximum WE price vector for the example in
Table 1 is pmax = (0;7;3). In Table 2, we give various price vectors and describe our notions
at those price vectors. In the table it holds that 0 <  < 1.
The following insights from Table 2 are worth noting.
 At price vector (0;0;0) no set of goods is underdemanded since N+((0;0;0)) = ;. But
sets of underdemanded goods may exist at low price vectors (for example good 2 is
underdemanded at price vector (0; 
2;)). In general, the existence of sets of underde-
manded or overdemanded goods depends on the relative prices of goods, in addition
to the entire price vector.
 Price vectors (0;4;1), (0;5;2) and (0;7;3) are WE price vectors. No set of goods is
overdemanded and no set of goods is underdemanded at these price vectors. Moreover,
6at the minimum WE price vector (0;4;1) no set of goods is weakly underdemanded.
Similarly, at the maximum WE price vector (0;7;3) no set of goods is weakly overde-
manded. These are no coincidences. In Theorems 1, 2, and 3 we formalize these
relations of sets of overdemanded and underdemanded goods with WE price vectors.
 At low enough price vectors, we expect sets of overdemanded goods to exist. In Table
2, we see that at price vectors below the minimum WE price vector (4;1), there is
always an overdemanded set of goods. Similarly, at price vectors above the maximum
WE price vector (7;3) there is always an underdemanded set of goods. We formalize
these results in Corollaries 1 and 2.
4 Characterization Results
In this section, we give a characterization of the price vector space. Our characterization of
the WE price vectors is based on the notions of sets of overdemanded and underdemanded
goods. Further, together with the notions of sets of weakly overdemanded and weakly un-
derdemanded goods, we characterize the minimum and maximum WE price vectors and the
price vectors that are not WE price vectors.
Dene M+(p) = fi 2 M : 0 = 2 Di(p)g for any price vector p. Notice that M+(p) =
O(N n f0g;p). Now, consider the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 Suppose no set of goods is overdemanded. Then there exists a feasible allocation
in which every buyer is assigned a good from his demand set.
Proof: Since N n f0g is not overdemanded, #(N n f0g)  #O(N n f0g;p) = #M+(p).
Consider S  M+(p). Let T = [i2SDi(p). Since 0 = 2 T and T is not overdemanded, we
get #T  #O(T;p)  #S. Using Hall's theorem (Hall, 1935), there is a feasible allocation
in which every buyer i in M+(p) can be assigned a good in Di(p), and every buyer in
M n M+(p) can be assigned the dummy good 0, which is in his demand set. 
Lemma 2 Suppose no set of goods is underdemanded. Then there exists a feasible allocation
in which every good in N+(p) is assigned to a buyer who is a demander of that good.
Proof: Since N+(p) is not underdemanded, #N+(p)  #U(N+(p);p)  #M. Consider
T  N+(p). Let S = U(T;p). Since T is not underdemanded, #T  #U(T;p) = #S. Using
Hall's theorem (Hall, 1935), there is a feasible allocation in which every good in N+(p) can
be assigned to a buyer who is a demander of that good, and the remaining buyers can be
assigned the dummy good. 
The absence of only overdemanded or only underdemanded sets of goods cannot guarantee
a WE price vector. For instance, consider an example with a single good and three buyers
7with values 10, 6, and 3. A WE price is any price between 6 and 10. At any price higher than
10, the good is not overdemanded but it is not a WE price. Similarly, at any price between 3
and 6, the good is not underdemanded but it is not a WE price. In some sense, Lemma 1 says
that condition (WE-1) in Denition 1 is satised in the absence of overdemanded goods,
but condition (WE-2) may be violated. Similarly, Lemma 2 says that condition (WE-2) in
Denition 1 is satised in the absence of underdemanded goods, but condition (WE-1) may
be violated. However, the WE prices can be precisely characterized by the absence of both
overdemanded and underdemanded sets of goods.
Theorem 1 A price vector p is a WE price vector if and only if no set of goods is overde-
manded and no set of goods is underdemanded at p.
Proof: Suppose p is a WE price vector. By condition (WE-2), there exists a feasible
allocation in which every good in N+(p) can be assigned to a unique demander of that
good. Hence no set of goods is underdemanded. If some set of goods, say, S  N n f0g, is
overdemanded, then condition (WE-1) will fail for some buyer in O(S;p) in every feasible
allocation, which is not true since p is a WE price vector. Hence no set of goods can be
overdemanded.
Suppose now that no set of goods is overdemanded and no set of goods is underdemanded
at price vector p. By Lemma 1 there is a non-empty set of feasible allocations   that
allocates every buyer a good from his demand set. Choose an allocation  2   for which
the number of goods from N+(p) that is allocated in  is maximal over all the allocations in
 . Let us call such an allocation a maximal allocation in  . Let T 0 = fj 2 N+(p) : i 6=
j 8 i 2 Mg. If T 0 = ;, then by denition (p;) is a WE. We will show that T 0 is empty.
Assume for contradiction that T 0 is not empty.
We rst show that for every buyer i 2 M, if i = 2 N+(p) then T 0 \ Di(p) = ;. Assume
for contradiction for some i 2 M with i = 2 N+(p) there exists j 2 T 0 \Di(p). In that case,
we can construct a new allocation 0 in which 0
i = j and 0
k = k for all k 6= i. Allocation
0 is in   and assigns one good more from N+(p) than  does. This is a contradiction since
 is a maximal allocation in  . As a result of this, the demanders of T 0 are assigned to
goods in N+(p) n T 0. Let X0 = U(T 0;p). So, X0  fi 2 M : i 2 N+(p) n T 0g. Now, for
any k  0, consider a sequence (T 0;X0;T 1;X1;:::;T k;Xk), where for every 1  q  k, T q
is the set of goods assigned to buyers in Xq 1 in  and Xq = U([
q
r=0T r;p) n U([
q 1
r=0T r;p).
Note that by denition T q \ T r = ; for every q 6= r.
We show that if T q 6= ; and T q  N+(p) for all 0  q  k, then there exists T k+1 6= ;
such that T k+1  N+(p) and T k+1\T q = ; for all 0  q  k. By denition of Xq, 0  q  k,
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Using equations (1) and (2), we get #Xk  #T 0. Since T 0 is non-empty, Xk is non-empty.
Dene T k+1 as the set of goods assigned to buyers in Xk in . Hence T k+1 is non-empty.
By denition T k+1 \ T q = ; for every 0  q  k. To show that T k+1  N+(p), assume for
contradiction that there exists a buyer ik 2 Xk such that ik = 2 N+(p). By denition of Xk,
ik should demand some good jk 2 T k. Now consider the sequence (ik;jk;ik 1;jk 1;:::;i0;j0),
where for every 0  q  k 1, iq 1 is the buyer assigned to good jq in  (note that iq 1 2 Xq 1
by denition) and jq 1 is a good demanded by iq 1 from T q 1 (such a good exists by the
denition of Xq 1 and T q 1). Now, construct an allocation 0 with 0
iq = jq for all 0  q  k
and 0
i = i for any i = 2 fi0;:::;ikg. Clearly, 0 2  . By assigning ik to jk, 0 assigns one
good more from N+(p) than  does, contradicting the fact that  is a maximal allocation in
 . Hence T k+1  N+(p). This process can be repeated innitely many times starting from
T 0. So (T 0;T 1;:::) is an innite sequence such that T q \ T r = ; for every q 6= r, T q 6= ; for
all q, and T q  N+(p) for all q. This is a contradiction since N+(p) is nite. So, T 0 = ;,
and therefore (p;) is a WE. 
The characterization in Theorem 1 shows that given a price vector and the demand sets
of buyers, it is possible to check if the given price vector is a WE price vector by checking
for the existence of overdemanded and underdemanded sets of goods. In some sense this is
a generalization of Hall's theorem (Hall, 1935) for our model.
In contrast to Denition 1, the characterization in Theorem 1 does not require to compute
a feasible allocation to check if a price vector is a WE price vector. Theorem 1 uses only
demand set information of buyers to characterize the WE price vectors. Further, it enables
us to characterize the minimum and the maximum WE price vectors (Theorems 2 and 3).
Notice that absence of overdemanded goods requires that there is no excess demand in
a weak sense, since we only count the exclusive demanders in checking for overdemanded
goods. Similarly, absence of underdemanded goods requires that there is no excess supply
in a weak sense, since zero priced goods are not counted while checking for underdemanded
9goods. Theorem 1 assures the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium at a price vector if there
is neither excess demand nor excess supply. This provides a direct economic interpretation
of our result.
Given the lattice structure of the set of WE price vectors, one is tempted to think that a
precise characterization of the minimum and maximum WE price vectors is possible, where
we relax the notions of excess demand and excess supply. We do this in the next two
theorems. In some sense, these theorems provide further generalizations of Hall's theorem
for our model.
Theorem 2 A price vector p is equal to pmin if and only if there is no overdemanded set of
goods and no weakly underdemanded set of goods at p.
Proof: Suppose p = pmin. By Theorem 1, no set of goods is overdemanded at p. We
need to show that no set of goods is weakly underdemanded. Assume for contradiction
that a set of goods, say, S  N, is weakly underdemanded. By denition S  N+(p) and
#U(S;p)  #S. Since p is a WE price vector, every good in S is assigned to a buyer in
his demand set at price vector p. So, #U(S;p)  #S. This implies that #U(S;p) = #S.
Since S  N+(p), we can decrease the price of goods in S by a suciently small amount
so that no buyer in M n U(S;p) demands a good from S. Buyers in U(S;p) will continue
to demand goods from S after such a price decrease. Thus, the new price vector is a WE
price vector, and is smaller than p = pmin. This is a contradiction since pmin is the unique
minimum WE price vector.
Now, we assume that no set of goods is overdemanded and no set of goods is weakly
underdemanded at a price vector p. Applying Theorem 1, p is a WE price vector. Assume
for contradiction that p 6= pmin. By denition of pmin, pj  pmin
j for all j 2 N and there
exists a set of goods S = fj 2 N : pj > pmin
j g. By our assumption S 6= ;. For all j 2 S, it
holds that pj > pmin
j  0, implying S  N+(p). Because S is not weakly underdemanded,
#U(S;p) > #S: (3)
Since prices of goods in S strictly decrease from p to pmin but remain the same for goods in
N nS, buyers in U(S;p) will only demand goods from S at price vector pmin. Using equation
(3), we can write #O(S;pmin)  #U(S;p) > #S. This means S is overdemanded at price
vector pmin. This is a contradiction by Theorem 1. 
At a WE price vector, every good with positive price is allocated to some demander of
that good. Hence, the number of demanders of such a set of positive price goods is at least
equal to the number of goods in that set. Absence of weakly underdemanded goods at a
WE price vector implies that for a set of goods with positive price, there is some buyer not
allocated to these goods who demands a good from that set. This provides an alternate
interpretation of Theorem 2. Also, the characterization of the minimum WE price vector
gives us an idea about the existence of overdemanded and weakly underdemanded sets of
goods in other regions of price vector space.
10Corollary 1 If p  pmin, then there exists an overdemanded set of goods. Further, if
p  pmin, then there exists a weakly underdemanded set of goods.
Proof: Suppose p  pmin. Let S = fj 2 N : pj < pmin
j g. Since p  pmin, S 6= ;. Further,
because pmin
j > pj  0 for all j 2 S, S  N+(pmin). Since prices of goods in S decrease
from pmin to p while prices of goods in N n S do not decrease, U(S;pmin)  O(S;p). So,
#O(S;p)  #U(S;pmin) > #S, where the last inequality follows from Theorem 2 (S is not
weakly underdemanded at pmin). Hence S is overdemanded at p.
Now, suppose p  pmin. Dene S0 = fj 2 N : pj > pmin
j g. Because p  pmin, S0 6= ;.
Further, since pj > pmin
j  0 for all j 2 S0, S0  N+(p). Since prices of goods in S0 decrease
from p to pmin while prices of goods in N n S0 do not decrease, U(S0;p)  O(S0;pmin). So,
#U(S0;p)  #O(S0;pmin)  #S0, where the last inequality follows from Theorem 2 (S0 is
not overdemanded at pmin). Hence S0 is weakly underdemanded at p. 
In every region of the price vector space with respect to pmin, Corollary 1 shows if an
overdemanded set of goods or a weakly underdemanded set of goods always exists in that
region.
To identify regions in the price vector space where underdemanded goods and weakly
overdemanded goods can be guaranteed, we give a characterization of the maximum WE
price vector.
Theorem 3 A price vector p is equal to pmax if and only if there is no weakly overdemanded
set of goods and no underdemanded set of goods at p.
Proof: Let p = pmax. By Theorem 1, no set of goods is underdemanded. We will show
that no set of goods is weakly overdemanded. Assume for contradiction that for some
; 6= S  N n f0g, S is weakly overdemanded. So, #O(S;p)  #S. Since p is a WE price
vector, S cannot be overdemanded. Hence, #O(S;p) = #S. By denition of WE, any WE
allocation should assign buyers in O(S;p) goods from S. Since buyers in O(S;p) do not
demand the dummy good, their payo is positive. Hence, by increasing the price of goods in
S by a suciently small amount, buyers in O(S;p) will continue to demand the same goods
in S at the higher price, and we will reach a higher WE price vector. This is a contradiction
since p = pmax is the unique maximum WE price vector.
Now, assume that no set of goods is weakly overdemanded and no set of goods is un-
derdemanded at p. Using Theorem 1, p is a WE price vector. Assume for contradiction
p 6= pmax. By denition of pmax, pj  pmax
j for all j 2 N and there exists a non-empty set
of goods S = fj 2 N : pj < pmax
j g. Since S is not weakly overdemanded at p, we can write
#O(S;p) < #S: (4)
By increasing prices from p to pmax, prices of goods in N n S do not increase but prices
of goods in S increase. This means buyers in M n O(S;p) will not have goods from S in
11their demand set at pmax. Using equation (4) we can write #U(S;pmax)  #O(S;p) < #S.
Since prices of goods in S increase, S  N+(pmax). Hence, S is underdemanded at pmax.
This is a contradiction. 
Consider a WE price vector and a set of goods that are allocated in that WE. If this
set of goods is not weakly overdemanded, then some of the buyers allocated to these goods
must demand a good not in this set of goods. This provides an alternate interpretation of
Theorem 3. Analogous to Corollary 1, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2 If p  pmax, then there exists a weakly overdemanded set of goods. Further, if
p  pmax, then there exists an underdemanded set of goods.
Proof: The proof is analogous to Corollary 1 except that we make use of Theorem 3 instead























Price of Good 1
Price of Good 2
No OD goods and no WUD goods No UD goods and no WOD goods
WOD
No OD goods and no UD goods (WE price vectors)
Figure 1: Various regions of the price vector space for the example in Table 1
The results in the paper so far are illustrated in Figure 1 for the example in Table 1.
The labelling in various regions of the gure indicates whether (weakly) overdemanded sets
of goods ((W)OD) and (weakly) underdemanded sets of goods ((W)UD) exist at all price
vectors in these regions. By Theorem 1, there is no set of overdemanded and underdemanded
goods in the lattice corresponding to the WE price vector region in Figure 1. The minimum
and the maximum WE price vectors are characterized by Theorems 2 and 3, respectively. The
other regions in Figure 1 are labelled using Corollaries 1 and 2. For example, for every price
vector in the upper-right corner, an underdemanded set of goods exist, whereas for every
12price vector in the lower-left corner, an overdemanded set of goods exist. The reader can also
see how dierent price vectors in Table 2 lie in various regions of Figure 1. Notice that once
every set of goods is weakly underdemanded, then no set of goods can be overdemanded.
This happens, for example when all prices are set equal or above the highest valuation of
the goods. Also, there exist regions (upper-left and lower-right corners in Figure 1) where
sets of underdemanded and overdemanded goods co-exist.
We can say something more about various price vectors than what the results in Corol-
laries 1 and 2 seem to indicate. If we decrease the prices of positive price goods at the
minimum WE price vector by an equal amount such that no price goes below zero, then at
the new price vector no weakly underdemanded goods exist. But, by Corollary 1, some set of
goods is overdemanded. So, if pmin 6= 0, then there is some non-zero price vector p  pmin
where no set of goods is weakly underdemanded but some set of goods is overdemanded.
This argument illustrates that we can draw a piecewise linear path from the minimum WE
price vector to the zero price vector along which no set of goods is weakly underdemanded
but some set of goods is overdemanded.
Similarly, if we increase the prices of positive price goods by an equal amount from the
maximum WE price vector, no set of goods is weakly overdemanded at the new price vector,
but some set of goods is underdemanded. So, the 45 degree straight line from the maximum
WE price vector in the north-east direction is a set of (innite) price vectors where no set
of goods is weakly overdemanded but some set of goods is underdemanded.
Our earlier results do not say anything about the structure of the sets of overdemanded
and underdemanded goods. In Table 2, we can see that a good can be both part of an
overdemanded set of goods and an underdemanded set of goods at some price vector, e.g.
at price vector (0;;3 + ), good 2 is underdemanded, and is also in the overdemanded
set f1;2g. But this anomaly is absent if we consider minimal overdemanded and minimal
underdemanded sets of goods. The following theorem reconciles these ideas.
Theorem 4 If a good is part of a minimal overdemanded set of goods at a price vector,
then it cannot be part of a minimal weakly underdemanded set of goods at that price vector.
Similarly, if a good is part of a minimal weakly overdemanded set of goods at a price vector,
then it cannot be part of a minimal underdemanded set of goods at that price vector.
Proof: Consider any price vector p. Let Su be a minimal weakly underdemanded set of
goods and let So be a minimal overdemanded set of goods at the price vector p. We will show
that Su\So = ;. Since Su is weakly underdemanded at p, #O(Su;p)  #U(Su;p)  #Su.
This shows that Su is not overdemanded at p. So, Su 6= So. Assume for contradiction
Su \ So 6= ;. There are three cases to consider.
Case 1: So ( Su. Since Su is minimal weakly underdemanded at p and Su n So is


























The last inequality comes from the fact that O(So;p) [ U(Su n So;p)  U(Su;p). Using
equation (5), we get a contradiction.
Case 2: Su ( So. Since So is minimal overdemanded and So n Su is not empty, So n Su


















The last inequality comes from the fact that O(So;p)  O(So n Su;p) [ U(Su;p). Using
equation (8), we get a contradiction.
Case 3: Su \So = T, T 6= Su, T 6= So, and T is non-empty. Since Su is minimal weakly
underdemanded, Su n T is not weakly underdemanded. This gives us
#U(S
u n T;p) > #(S
u n T): (9)
Similarly, So n T is not overdemanded, which gives us
#O(S
o n T;p)  #(S
o n T): (10)
Denote Y = O(So;p) n O(So n T;p). From the denition of Y , every buyer in Y demands
goods from So only but at least some good from T. Hence, Y \ U(Su n T;p) = ;. This




u n T;p) + #Y
> #(S









The last inequality follow from the fact that T ( So and T ( Su. It implies that Su is
not weakly underdemanded. This is a contradiction.
Using an analogous proof, it can be shown that if a good is part of a minimal weakly
overdemanded set of goods, then it cannot be part of a minimal underdemanded set of goods.

5 Implications of Characterization Results
Our characterizations, besides being of theoretical interest, has some implications in some
practical applications. These applications mainly arise in contexts where the minimum or the
maximum WE price vector is used to price the goods. We describe some of these applications
below, and implications of our characterization result in these applications.
5.1 Marginal Economies
Marginal economies, in which either a single buyer or a single good is removed from the
original economy, play a vital role in various game theoretic solutions. For example, the
payment of a buyer in the VCG mechanism can be computed by analyzing the marginal
economy corresponding to that buyer. Also, marginal payo vectors are focal point of many
cooperative game solutions (e.g., the Shapley value).
In general, we denote an economy with goods A  N with 0 2 A and buyers B  M
as E(A;B) (i.e., only goods in A and buyers in B are present). Denote as pmin(A;B)
and pmax(A;B) the minimum and the maximum WE price vectors of economy E(A;B),
respectively. Also, for any price vector p 2 R
jAj
+ the vector of components of p except the
jth component pj is denoted as p j. Using our earlier results we show next how the lattice
of WE price vectors shifts in marginal economies.
Theorem 5 For every A  N with 0 2 A and B  M,
(a) pmin(A;B n fig)  pmin(A;B)  pmax(A;B n fig)  pmax(A;B) for all i 2 B,
(b) pmin
 j (A;B)  pmin(A n fjg;B)  pmax
 j (A;B)  pmax(A n fjg;B) for all j 2 A.
15Proof: Proof of (a): For some i 2 B, consider the marginal economy E(A;B n fig). By
Theorem 2, no set of goods is overdemanded and no set of goods is weakly underdemanded
at pmin(A;B) in economy E(A;B). By removing buyer i, no set of goods is overdemanded at
pmin(A;B) in economy E(A;Bnfig). Now, consider a set of goods S which has positive prices
in pmin(A;B). Since S is not weakly underdemanded, we can write #B(S;pmin(A;B)) >
#S, and so #B(S;pmin(A;B))  #S + 1. In economy E(A;B n fig) the demand of buyers
in B n fig do not change at pmin(A;B). Hence the number of demanders of S in economy
E(A;B n fig) is equal to #B(S;pmin(A;B))   1  #S. Hence S is not underdemanded at
pmin(A;B) in economy E(A;B n fig). Since no set of goods is overdemanded and no set of
goods is underdemanded at pmin(A;B) in economy E(A;B nfig), pmin(A;B) is a WE price
vector of economy E(A;B n fig) (due to Theorem 1). By the lattice structure of the WE
price vector space, we get that pmin(A;B n fig)  pmin(A;B)  pmax(A;B n fig).
By Theorem 3, no set of goods is weakly overdemanded and no set of of goods is un-
derdemanded at pmax(A;B) in economy E(A;B). By removing a buyer i 2 B, no set of
goods is weakly overdemanded at pmax(A;B) in economy E(A;B n fig). By Corollary 2,
pmax(A;B n fig)  pmax(A;B).
Proof of (b): For some j 2 A, consider the marginal economy E(A n fjg;B). By
Theorem 3, no set of goods is underdemanded and no set of goods is weakly overdemanded
at pmax(A;B) in economy E(A;B). By removing a good j no set of goods is underdemanded
in economy E(A n fjg;B) at pmax
 j (A;B). Now consider S  (A n fj;0g). Let K be the
exclusive demanders of S at pmax
 j (A;B) in economy E(A n fjg;B). Buyers who are the
exclusive demanders of S [ fjg at pmax(A;B) in economy E(A;B) are the buyers from K
plus the exclusive demanders of good j. With respect to economy E(A;B), we can write
#O(S[fjg;pmax(A;B)) = #O(fjg;pmax(A;B))+#K < #S+1 (since S[fjg is not weakly
overdemanded at pmax(A;B)). Since fjg is not weakly overdemanded at pmax(A;B), we get
#O(fjg;pmax(A;B)) = 0. Therefore, #K < #S + 1, and so #K  #S. Hence S is not
overdemanded at pmax
 j (A;B) in economy E(A n fjg;B). By Theorem 1, pmax
 j (A;B) is a
WE price vector of economy E(A n fjg;B). By the lattice structure of the set of WE price
vectors, we get pmin(A n fjg;B)  pmax
 j (A;B)  pmax(A n fjg;B).
By Theorem 2, no set of goods is weakly underdemanded at pmin(A;B) in economy
E(A;B). By removing a good j 2 A, no set of goods is weakly underdemanded at pmin
 j (A;B)
in economy E(A n fjg;B). By Corollary 1, pmin
 j (A;B)  pmin(A n fjg;B). 
We remark that part of Theorem 5 is proved in Gul and Stacchetti (1999) (Theorem 7
in their paper). In a general model where buyers have gross substitutes valuation functions,
which is satised in our model, Gul and Stacchetti (1999) show that for all A  N, and
for all B  M: (a) pmin(A;B n fig)  pmin(A;B) and pmax(A;B n fig)  pmax(A;B) for
all i 2 B; (b) pmin
 j (A;B)  pmin(A n fjg;B) and pmax
 j (A;B)  pmax(A n fjg;B) for all
j 2 A. Our results in Theorem 5 are more general than this for the unit demand setting, in
the sense that we also show that pmin(A;B) is a WE price vector of economy E(A;B n fig)
16for all i 2 B and pmax
 j (A;B) is a WE price vector of economy E(A n fjg;B) for all j 2 A.
This is not valid for the general model with gross substitutes valuations. Moreover, our
proofs use the characterization results above and are very dierent from the proofs given in
Gul and Stacchetti (1999).
As a corollary to Theorem 5, we have the following result (Corollary 3 is essentially the
new contribution of Theorem 5 with respect to Gul and Stacchetti (1999)).
Corollary 3 Consider any A  N with 0 2 A and B  M. pmin(A;B) is a WE price vector
of economy E(A;B n fig) for all i 2 B and pmax
 j (A;B) is a WE price vector of economy
E(A n fjg;B) for all j 2 A.
To summarize Theorem 5, by removing a buyer from the economy (essentially reducing
demand), the WE price vector lattice shifts downwards. Similarly, by removing a good from
the economy (essentially reducing supply), the WE price vector lattice shifts upwards (in
a dimension that is one less than the dimension of the original lattice). So, the standard
intuitions of economics that prices decrease with lowering of demand and increase with
lowering of supply continue to hold in our model.
Connections between WE price vectors and the VCG payments of buyers can be made
using Corollary 3. To remind, the VCG mechanism chooses an ecient allocation and asks
every buyer to pay his externality on other buyers. This allocation and payment scheme
makes it a strategy-proof and ecient mechanism. It can be shown, using standard lin-
ear programming duality arguments, that if pmin(N;M) is a WE price vector of economy
E(N;M) and therefore by Corollary 3 also a WE price vector of the marginal economy
E(N;M nfig) for every i 2 M, then the VCG payment of every buyer i 2 M is pmin
i (M;N),
where  is an ecient allocation of economy E(M;N) (Leonard, 1983). This proves that
payments in a Walrasian equilibrium corresponding to the minimum Walrasian price vector
are precisely the VCG payments of buyers. But we can also relate the VCG payment of a
buyer to the maximum WE price vector of a marginal economy corresponding to that buyer
using Corollary 3.
Proposition 1 For every buyer i 2 M it holds that his VCG payment is equal to pmax
i (N;Mn
fig), where  is an ecient allocation chosen by the VCG mechanism.
Proof: For any A  N with 0 2 A and B  M, dene V (A;B) as the total value of the
buyers in an ecient allocation of economy E(A;B) and let P(B;p) be the total payo of
the buyers in B at price vector p. If p is a WE price vector of economy E(A;B), then
V (A;B) = P(B;p) +
P
j2A pj (this can be deduced from standard linear programming
arguments, see for example Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002)). Now, consider an ecient
allocation  of economy E(N;M). The claim clearly holds for buyer i 2 M if i = 0. For
17i 6= 0, the VCG payment of buyer i 2 M can be written as
p
V CG
i = V (N;M n fig)   V (N n fig;M n fig)
= P(M n fig;p





j (N;M n fig)
  P(M n fig;p





j (N;M n fig)
= p
max
i (N;M n fig);
since by Corollary 3 it holds that pmax
 i (N;M n fig) is a WE price vector of economy
E(N n fig;M n fig). 
Since the VCG payments correspond to pmin(N;M), we have the following corollary of
Proposition 1.
Corollary 4 Let  be an ecient allocation of economy E(N;M). Then pmin
i (N;M) =
pmax
i (N;M n fig) for all i 2 M, and pmin
j (N;M) = 0 for all j 2 N that is unassigned in .
Proposition 1 gives an alternative interpretation of the VCG payment of a buyer. The
VCG payment of a buyer is the maximum payment that can be received in a WE in the
marginal economy without him for the good assigned to him in the VCG mechanism. Corol-
lary 4 relates the minimum WE price vector of an economy to the maximum WE price
vector of its marginal economies corresponding to buyers. Such a relationship between the
maximum WE price vector and the minimum WE price vector of marginal economies corre-
sponding to goods does not hold. This can be veried from the example in Table 1.
5.2 Existing Iterative Auctions
Iterative auctions, where prices monotonically increase (ascending auctions) or decrease
(descending auctions) are practical and transparent methods to sell goods. The design
of iterative auctions for our model has been studied earlier - ascending auctions can be
found in Demange et al. (1986) and Sankaran (1994), whereas descending auctions can be
found in Sotomayor (2002) and Mishra and Veeramani (2006) 4. These auctions termi-
nate at a WE price vector - the auctions in Demange et al. (1986), Sankaran (1994), and
Mishra and Veeramani (2006) terminate at the minimum WE price vector, while the auc-
tion in Sotomayor (2002) terminates at the maximum WE price vector 5. Moreover, the
underlying price adjustment in these auctions is based on the ideas of overdemanded and
4The auction in Mishra and Veeramani (2006) is an ascending auction for a procurement (production)
economy. An ascending auction in a procurement economy translates to a descending auction in our model.
5Since minimum WE price vector corresponds to the VCG payments, the auctions in Demange et al.
(1986), Sankaran (1994), and Mishra and Veeramani (2006) have truthful bidding in an equilibrium, whereas
buyers can manipulate the auction in Sotomayor (2002).
18underdemanded sets of goods. Interestingly, the papers on ascending auctions do not talk
about underdemanded sets of goods and use the notion overdemanded sets of goods only.
Similarly, the papers on descending auctions do not talk about overdemanded sets of goods
and use the notion of (weakly) underdemanded sets of goods only. The terminating con-
ditions in these auctions are absence of overdemanded sets of goods for ascending auctions
and absence of underdemanded sets of goods for descending auctions. Still, these auctions
terminate at an extreme WE price vector. Our results can be used to explain why this is
possible. In the rest of this section, we assume valuations of buyers and prices to be integers.
Consider the following class of ascending auctions:
S0 Start the auction at a price vector p where no set of goods is weakly underdemanded
(by Corollary 1, p  pmin);
S1 Collect demand sets of buyers and check if an overdemanded set of goods exist;
S2 If no overdemanded set of goods exist, then stop (by Theorem 2, this is the minimum
WE price vector);
S3 Else increase prices of goods such that no set of goods is weakly underdemanded at
the new price vector, and repeat from Step (S1).
The auctions in Demange et al. (1986) and Sankaran (1994) are such auctions, though
they do not mention this explicitly. Both these auctions start from the zero price vector 6. At
the zero price vector, no set of goods is weakly underdemanded. In Step (S3), Demange et al.
(1986) increase prices by unity for goods in a minimal overdemanded set, whereas Sankaran
(1994) increases prices by unity for goods in an overdemanded set, which he nds using a
labeling algorithm of graph theory. Both the price adjustments ensure that no set of goods
is weakly underdemanded after the price increase (i.e., satisfy Step (S3)), and we stay below
the minimum WE price vector (by Corollary 1).
The descending auctions share an analogous feature. Consider the following class of
descending auctions:
S0 Start the auction at a price vector p where no set of goods is weakly overdemanded
(by Corollary 2, p  pmax);
S1 Collect demand sets of buyers and check if an underdemanded set of goods exist;
S2 If no underdemanded set of goods exist, then stop (by Theorem 3, this is the maximum
WE price vector);
S3 Else decrease prices of goods such that no set of goods is weakly overdemanded at the
new price vector, and repeat from Step (S1).
6To be precise, they use the reserve price of every good as the starting price, which is assumed to be zero
in our model.
19The auction in Sotomayor (2002) starts from a very high price vector where every buyer
demands only the dummy good. Hence no set of goods is weakly overdemanded. By de-
creasing prices by unity for goods in a minimal underdemanded set, no set of goods is weakly
overdemanded after the price decrease, and the price in the auction stays above the maximum
WE price vector.
This class of descending auctions can be modied to terminate at the minimum WE price
vector. Such auctions have to start from a price vector where no set of goods is overdemanded
(by Corollary 2 such a price vector is above the minimum WE price vector). These auctions
should stop if no set of goods is weakly underdemanded, and price decrease should be such
that no set of goods is overdemanded at the new price vector.
Thus, our characterization results unify the existing iterative auctions by bringing them
under a broad class of auctions. We hope that this will be useful in identifying more iterative
auctions from this class which are easier to implement in practice than the auctions known
in the literature.
Finaly, a note on the incentive properties of these auctions. It is well known that submit-
ting true demand sets in each iteration of ascending and descending auctions that terminate
at the minimum WE price vector is an ex post Nash equilibrium (Bikhchandani et al., 2002).
This can be reconciled from the fact that the minimum WE price vector corresponds to the
VCG payments of buyers in our setting (Leonard, 1983). Hence, all auctions discussed in
this section that terminate at the minimum WE price vector share this incentive property.
6 Conclusions
We characterize the Walrasian equilibrium price vectors for economies with indivisible goods
and unit demand. Our characterizations are based on the notions of overdemanded sets of
goods and underdemanded sets of goods. These notions also lead to characterizations of
extreme points of the Walrasian equilibrium price vector space. As a consequence of these
characterizations, we are able to classify the space of price vectors into regions where (weakly)
overdemanded and (weakly) underdemanded goods are guaranteed to exist. We discuss some
implications of such a classication, including how the space of Walrasian equilibrium price
vectors looks in marginal economies and how it forms the underlying basis of iterative auction
design.
A generalization of our characterizations, for settings where buyers can be assigned more
than one good, is a useful direction of future research. However, Walrasian equilibrium
may fail to exist in such general settings, except under specic types of valuations called
gross substitutes valuations (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999). Gross substitutes valuations not
only ensure existence of Walrasian equilibrium, but also ensure that the space of Walrasian
equilibrium price vectors form a lattice (Gul and Stacchetti, 1999). Under gross substitutes
valuations, the concept of overdemanded goods has been generalized in Gul and Stacchetti
(2000), where they design ascending auctions using this concept. It remains to be seen
20whether our characterizations can be extended to gross substitutes valuations.
Another line of future research is to identify specic auctions from the broad class of
auctions described in Section 5.2, and compare them (say in terms of computation and
communication overhead or some parameter that is relevant in practice) with the existing
auctions in the literature.
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